



Mr. Changrok SOH

Chair, Human Rights Committee

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

Palais Wilson - 52, rue des Pâquis

CH-1201 Geneva (Switzerland)

Via E-mail: ccpr@ohchr.org; ohchr-ccpr@un.org

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NGO Report on the Dominion of Canada for the 145th Session of the Human Rights Committee / Rapport des ONG sur le Dominion du Canada pour la 145e session du Comité des droits de l'homme

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Introduction

1. The Centre for Voters Initiative & Action presents this report to the United Nations Human Rights Committee ahead of the 145th Session for the review of Canada. The Centre is a non-governmental organisation based in the Americas with an international focus. The Centre acknowledges there can be no secure tomorrow without ensuring civil societies have knowledge to vote, participate, and engage with the democratic processes.

2. The Centre works with multiple international mechanisms to convey dialogue, conduct research, and bring awareness to the thematic issues of electoral engagement around the world. We closely follow and participate in the United Nations human rights mechanisms in Geneva and abroad, including the Human Rights Committee, to promote civil society participation in the public affairs process.
3. The Centre submits this ahead of the seventh periodic review of Canada under the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. Recognising the complex nature of the recent challenge Canada faces, the Centre hopes to provide valuable information to the Committee regarding the State's compliance with issues exacerbating in compliance under Article 25. Indeed, this report is focused on the scope of Article 25, and we encourage Committee members to understand the nature of civic education as a tool to combat this contemporary turmoil; hopefully, the Committee will find this report valuable.
4. The Centre has submitted this petition to the Committee to address three Article 25 issues: (1) barriers to voting access; (2) insufficient safeguards against external interference and misinformation; and (3) inadequate campaign finance regulation and oversight. It further identifies provincial-level systemic barriers to civic education and participatory access that exacerbate these federal deficiencies.

Federal Limitations to Participation in the Public and Political Life

Bill C-65 as a Failed Mechanism for Advancing Electoral Resilience

5. Bill C-65, formally titled the *Electoral Participation Act*, was introduced on 20 March 2024 by Minister Dominic LeBlanc as a comprehensive set of amendments to the Canada Elections Act intended to modernise and secure the democratic process.¹ The bill aimed to reduce barriers to political participation by implementing practical logistical reforms, and was an agreement between the Liberal government and the New Democratic Party (NDP) coalition. At this stage, the evolution of the bill was focused on expanding the Canada Elections Act by securing electoral resilience.
6. In particular, the initiative aims to (1) add two additional days of advance polling and add flexibility of voting in rural areas, especially by allowing voters to attend polls at post-secondary schools, increasing the number of voting centres; (2) extending the ban on undue foreign influence and partisan advertising to be enforced at all times, rather than only in an “active election period”; and (3) strengthening campaign finance protection by prohibiting political contributions in unconventional payment methods and capped the limit of individual donations to a candidate.

¹ HOUSE OF COMMONS OF CANADA, *Bill C-65: An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act / Loi modifiant la Loi électorale du Canada*, (20 March 2024), https://www.parl.ca/Content/Bills/441/Government/C-65/C-65_1/C-65_1.PDF.

7. However, the initiative failed largely due to the fact that former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau prorogued Parliament on 6 January 2025.² Under Canadian Parliament rules, any legislation that has not yet received Royal ascent at the time of prorogation is considered “entirely terminated” and therefore moot on the order bill. It was, effectively, killed. Due to Bill C-65 still being considered on the Committee stage, it ceased to exist legally, despite passing its second reading in the House of Commons, indicating a general support for its principles. The vote was 170 votes in favour, and 148 against.³

The Centre would briefly like to clarify three ongoing issues related to Article 25 in Canada that fall within the scope of this legislation; we hope the Committee will recognise this previously dead bill as a tool for the realisation of public and political rights of Canadians, thereby enquiring on its status and potential for revitalisation to advance the goals of the Covenant.

Barriers to Voting Access

8. Bill C-65 sought to reduce administrative and practical barriers to voting, especially for groups with historically lower turnout and high access costs. These groups include: youth, students, seniors, persons with disabilities, and residents of remote communities. This bill did not expand the right to vote substantively, but rather modified the mechanisms through which that right is exercised. Bill C-65 would have explicitly authorised the Chief Electoral Officer to establish special ballot voting offices in educational institutions, including secondary schools where appropriate.⁴
9. Particularly for students, on-campus voting faces various challenges. *Vote on Campus* is an example of a programme which allows students to vote at temporary polling offices set on post-secondary campuses. As promising as this may seem, this created problems; firstly, legal fragility. Without explicitly statutory authorisation, programmes could be reduced or discontinued without parliamentary oversight. A report published by Office of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada (colloquially known as *Elections Canada* on 12 March 2025 states: “[r]eturning officers are instructed to offer extended voting services to electors in certain circumstances that are not specifically described in the Canada Elections Act [...] in the past, *Elections Canada* established voting locations at post-secondary institutions”.⁵
10. Voting is therefore operated by interpreting existing administrative authority, not by relying on a clear, unambiguous legal provision passed by Parliament. Thus, despite the bill’s demonstrated benefits, including more than 110,000 votes cast on

² HONDERICH Holly, *What happens next for Canada?*, BBC News, (7 January 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czjdr98n1kxo>.

³ HOUSE OF COMMONS OF CANADA, *Bill C-65: An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act*.

⁴ ELECTIONS CANADA, *Directive on Serving Electors on Campus*, (12 March 2025), https://www.elections.ca/res/poli/polins/dsec/dsec_e.pdf.

⁵ Ibid.

campuses in 2019,⁶ its existence, scope, and continuity depended on internal decisions of *Elections Canada* and operational readiness rather than durable legal entitlement. Bill C-65 proposed formalisation would have removed that fragility by anchoring the program in the Canada Elections Act.

11. Additionally, in some electoral cycles, *Elections Canada* has not offered campus voting for operational reasons, illustrating that the program was not a guaranteed right but an operational service. University of British Columbia's Alma Mater Society Vice President Saad Shoaid told *CBC News* that "[t]here's youth voter studies out there that show youth believe voting doesn't make a difference, and I think these types of actions, and the lack of deployment of special ballot polling stations, exacerbates those negative trends".⁷
12. Indeed, the nature of the programme is contingent: it could be present one cycle and absent the next regardless of need, because it was not legislatively guaranteed. Furthermore, if a voter were to challenge the absence or unequal application of *Vote on Campus*, courts would likely find that no specific legal right exists under the Act, because the Act simply contains no express provision for such offices. In contrast, statutory rights are subject to clear judicial interpretation.
13. In practical terms, codifying campus voting into the Canada Elections Act would have conferred several critical benefits. First, it would have transformed a discretionary administrative practice into a legally guaranteed entitlement, ensuring that all eligible students have consistent access to voting. By anchoring the program in law, Bill C-65 would have elevated campus voting from a beneficial but contingent service to a structurally embedded feature of Canada's electoral system, helping address persistent gaps in turnout among first-time voters, demonstrating that institutional innovation in voter access is not optional, but a recognised duty of the state.

Public Awareness of External Interference and Misinformation

14. A report published from Ottawa on 2 October 2025, the *Retrospective Report* focused on the implementation of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPP) and ongoing security and intelligence threats emphasised the importance of safeguarding elections.⁸


⁶ WENTZELL Stephen, *Student voters decry suspension of Vote on Campus program*, Rabble Canada, (2 September 2021), <https://rabble.ca/politics/canadian-politics/student-voters-decry-suspension-vote-campus-program/>.

⁷ SHARKEY Jackie, *Students tell Elections Canada to do more after it cancels Vote on Campus program*, CBC News, (25 August 2021), <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/kitchener-waterloo/campus-university-elections-canada-vote-election-1.6152150>.

⁸ CRITICAL ELECTION INCIDENT PUBLIC PROTOCOL, *Retrospective Report on the 45th General Election*, (2 October 2025), <https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/services/protecting-democracy/critical-election-incident-public-protocol/retrospective-report-45th-general-election.html>.

Ultimately, the role of foreign election interference was supposedly “detected”, but ultimately deemed to “not have affected the integrity of the election” nor “ability of Canadians [...] to choose their democratic representatives freely and fairly”.⁹

15. For the years 2025 and 2026, CAD 44,000,000 will be allocated to the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer to prevent against threats to the electoral process such as foreign interference and disinformation.¹⁰ This is a continuum of CAD 9,800,000, along with CAD 52,450,000 for other purposes.¹¹ This distribution is outlined below, and for that, the State party should be commended. In particular, the Centre’s thorough analysis of the CEIPP’s summary report to be both well-written and clear, pointing to the wide range of issues presented by foreign attempts to interfere in the election.



16. In one such case, the report notes that an activist, Joseph Tay of Conservative Party of Canada, and a candidate in the riding of Toronto, was presented with a warrant for arrest by the Hong Kong Police in December 2024 over allegations of “inciting secession” and “colluding with foreign forces”.¹² Whatsmore, Tay is an activist known for pro-democracy efforts in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
17. Following the issuance of the warrant, the Canadian government observed a rise in “inauthentic and coordinated amplification” of misinformation, resulting in high levels of engagement before the election, thereby clouding the integrity of the race.¹³ However, a government panel quickly gathered on 31 March 2025 to discuss the matter, and on 21 April, alerted the Canadian public in a news conference, published a news release in simplified and traditional Chinese.¹⁴ The counter-misinformation campaign is an ideal, golden standard.

⁹ See *Retrospective Report on the 45th General Election*.

¹⁰ CANADA, *Government of Canada Publishes Election Security and Integrity Reports Covering the 45th General Election*, (2 October 2025), <https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/news/2025/10/government-of-canada-publishes-election-security-and-integrity-reports-covering-the-45th-general-election.html>.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² See *Retrospective Report on the 45th General Election*, p. 13.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

18. In the case of Tay, the Committee should note that the Canadian government already has ideal tools and governmental systems in place to preserve the integrity of Article 25, in ways that most other parties to the Covenant cannot realise. For that, the State party should be commended; perhaps the Committee would even admire these bureaucratic systems as a goal for a true liberal democracy in ideal conformity with Article 25.
19. However, the implementation of the CEIPP's goals still faces limitations, several of which the Committee should be concerned with to advance the realisation of Article 25 principles. After its establishment in the 2021 election, independent expert monitoring the CEIPP Morris Rosenberg criticised the Protocol, declaring that "[c]ommunication on the protocol needs to change, [since n]obody knew about it. It's called the public protocol".¹⁵ Indeed, for elections to be truly "genuine", citizens need more than just formal protections *de iure* but effective awareness of the mitigation, prevention, and response to threats. Public protocols which are not well known nor understood weaken transparency and popular confidence, contributing to an undermining of legitimacy.
20. Whatsoever, a common parliamentary discussion centres on the threshold to decide when to publicly notify Canadians about a foreign interference incident; the procedure in, for instance the case of Tay, was executed well but lacked a structural order. There lacks a specificity on the threshold which must be reached in defining a "threat" which must eventually be notified publicly to Canadians. Notably, in a House of Commons exchange, Bloc Québécois MP Marie-Hélène Gaudreau asked about the threshold for alerting the public, revealing the Panel decided only due to there being "no spike in activity".¹⁶ Indeed, if the Canadian civil society is only informed under undefined or subjective criterion, then citizens may not be fully aware of meaningful threats.
21. With regards to the Canada Electoral Participation Act, Section 12, in amendment to the current s. 91(2) of the Canada Elections Act, states that:
 - a. "Subsection (1) applies regardless of the place where the election is held or the place where the false statement is made or published and regardless of the manner or medium in which the false statement is made or published."¹⁷
22. Thus, Section 12 of the proposed and failed bill would explicitly remove territorial and medium-based loopholes; CEIPP would have authority through domestic law to make enforcement possible even when interference originates abroad or online.

¹⁵ GULY Christopher, *Feds need to better communicate what Critical Election Incident Public Protocol does, says Rosenberg*, The Hill Times, (27 March 2023), <https://www.hilltimes.com/story/2023/03/27/better-communication-needed-with-critical-election-incident-public-protocol-says-rosenberg/382656/>.

¹⁶ See the *Study on the matter of Foreign Election Interference* by the Canadian Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, meeting 9 February 2023, at <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/trnsprnc/brfng-mtrls/prlmntry-bndrs/20230629/27-en.aspx>.

¹⁷ HOUSE OF COMMONS OF CANADA, *Bill C-65: An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act*.

These mechanisms would only strengthen the existing institutions, strengthening free formation of political opinion. Lastly, a known foreign interference tactic, recognised by CEIPP in their report on the previous election, is the manipulation of nominations. The proposed addition of Sections 92.1 and 92.2 are as follows:

- a. “92.1 No person or entity shall convey or cause to be conveyed false or misleading information to be included in a nomination paper.
- b. 92.2 No person who files a nomination paper under section 67 shall file a nomination paper containing false or misleading information.”¹⁸

23. These two clauses highlight the potential benefit that the proposed legislation could have brought with regards to electoral rights and sealing some of the gaps the CEIPP has flagged in its review processes. However, nothing in Bill C-65 obliges the CEIPP to disclose interference findings to voters in real time; Canada criminalises interferences after the fact, but voters may still cast ballots without full knowledge of the extent of compromise of their information environment. Certainly, the Committee should recognise C-65 as a strong move towards an increased realisation of Article 25, whilst also pressing on the legal gap regarding procedural steps for misinformation disclosure to citizens.

Campaign Finance Regulations

24. It should be noted that Canada already has one of the most restrictive and regulated campaign finance regimes among democracies. Before 2025, Canadian citizens or permanent residents were the only individuals who could donate. Since 2003, corporate or union donations have been banned federally. However, limits applied separately to political parties, riding associations, candidates and leadership constraints. Despite these strengths, corruption concerns shifted away from parties and toward third parties and modern financial tools.

25. As of 2025, the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada limited contributions to \$1,750 a year to each political party.¹⁹ In 2015, the limit was set at \$1,500 and now, the amount increases by \$25 on the 1st of January annually.²⁰ Furthermore, a singular candidate is able to devote up to \$5,000 to their own campaign, whilst leadership candidates are able to contribute \$25,000 on their own campaign.²¹ Each type of candidate is also permitted to donate up to the standard maximum amount of \$1,750 to another candidate or to a leadership contestant.

¹⁸ HOUSE OF COMMONS OF CANADA, *Bill C-65: An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act*, p. 5.

¹⁹ See the *Political Financing Handbook for Registered Parties and Chief Agents* (EC 20231), January 2025: <https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?dir=pol%2Ffin%2Fec20231&document=p1&lang=e§ion=pol&utm>.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

26. A report published by the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada on 7 June 2022 highlights the existent transparency gaps; “a growing share of third-party inflows are recorded as “own funds” rather than traceable contributions which obscures the original sources of funding and may allow hidden influence”.²²
27. Canada’s contribution limits appear neutral and restrictive, yet they raise concerns about substantive equality rather than formal equality. Self-financing allowances create unequal starting positions among candidates. While third-party and individual donations are capped at \$1,750 annually per party, candidates may contribute \$5,000 to their own campaigns. For example, *Democracy Watch* argues that current limits still favour wealthy donors and candidates.²³ Thus, this privileges individuals with greater personal wealth and can discourage qualified candidates from lower-income backgrounds from running or competing effectively. These risks transforming economic capacity into a gatekeeping mechanism for political participation, undermining the Article 25 realisation for Canadian citizens.
28. Moreover, the maximum donation amount of \$1,750 to other candidates introduces the risk of internal party influence. Indeed, each individual contribution remains within legal limits, nevertheless this allows candidates to collectively support a single leadership contender, potentially shaping internal party outcomes in ways that lack transparency in face of voters. Thus, this undermines the principles that political competition should be based on ideas and public support rather than financial coordination among elites.

In light of this information, the Centre respectfully asks the Committee to note the use of the moot Bill C-65 as a mechanism to remedy the three aforementioned issues undermining Article 25. The Centre hopes the status and potential revitalisation of Bill C-65 is brought up in both the dialogue and recommendations, along with the issues its lack of implementation currently presents.

Whilst Canada indeed possesses strong electoral institutions and commitment to participation in the public and political life, addressing these issues, especially with Bill-65 as a common denominator solution, can advance the realisation of democratic participation for all.

²² PERRAULT Stéphane, *Meeting New Challenges: Recommendations from the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada following the 43rd and 44th General Elections*, Office of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, (7 June 2022), https://www.elections.ca/res/rep/off/rec_2022/rec2022_e.pdf.

²³ CONACHER Duff, *Federal political donation and loan limit should be lowered to \$75, public funding implemented if parties can’t raise enough*, Democracy Watch Canada, (21 February 2024), <https://democracywatch.ca/federal-political-donation-and-loan-limit-should-be-lowered-to-75-public-funding-implemented-if-parties-cant-raise-enough/>.

Provincial Limitations to Civic Education and Participatory Access

Insufficient Pre-Service Training and Teacher Preparedness

29. Whilst Canada's education system has many notable strengths, foundational barriers are present and affect the quality of civic education in the country. Particularly teachers have a substantive lack of training and preparation for civics and citizenship courses. *Civics on the Sidelines*, a national study surveying 1,922 Canadian educators, characterises this as a "systemic failure" in preparing teachers to deliver civic education effectively.²⁴ The study found that 75% of respondents reported that their teacher education programs did not include civics or citizenship education, and a comparable proportion indicated that educators assigned to teach civics are often insufficiently qualified or lack subject matter confidence.²⁵
30. This can be supported by reports by *The Canadian Parliamentary Review*.²⁶ Similarly, this roundtable observed that civic education is frequently assigned to early-career or non-specialist teachers, often by default rather than design. One participant noted that civics courses are taught by those "willing to take it on simply because they're new",²⁷ underscoring that assignment decisions are shaped by staffing convenience rather than pedagogical expertise. Together, these findings point to a structural pattern: civic education is treated as a secondary or peripheral subject within teacher training institutions, rather than as a core democratic competency.
31. Several interrelated factors explain why pre-service civic education training remains underdeveloped. Firstly, jurisdictional fragmentation exacerbates the problem. Because education falls under provincial and territorial authority, there is no national standard requiring teacher candidates to demonstrate competency in civics or democratic education. This results in uneven preparation across provinces and institutions, with civic education often viewed as optional or context-dependent rather than universally.
32. At the systemic level, this deficit produces unequal access to quality civic education as student exposure becomes contingent on whether an individual teacher has personal interest or informal expertise in civic matters. This creates a form of educational arbitrariness, whereby democratic literacy is unevenly distributed across regions, schools, and socio-economic contexts.

²⁴ CIVIX, *Civics on the Sidelines: A National Survey of Canadian Educators on Citizenship Education*, (December 2023), p. 18, <https://civix.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/CIVIX-Civics-on-the-Sidelines.pdf>.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 33.

²⁶ Note that this is an edited and revised transcript from discussions with various actors in Canada. Greg Essensa is Ontario's Chief Electoral Officer and the CEO of Elections Ontario. Heather Lank is the Parliamentary Librarian at the Library of Parliament. Dimitri Pavlounis is the Research Director at CIVIX. Beatrice Wayne is the Research Director at the Samara Centre for Democracy. Diane Vautour is a Toronto-based teacher who previously worked as an Educational Consultant/ Education Officer for the Ministry of Education in Ontario with civics as her portfolio. See the full transcript, *The State of Civic Education: A Roundtable* (March 2024) here: <https://www.revparcan.ca/en/the-state-of-civic-education-a-roundtable/>.

²⁷ Ibid.

Unequal Access and Resource Disparities in Rural Communities and Indigenous Reserves

33. In rural communities and Indigenous reserves, education differs structurally from urban and southern contexts, and these differences directly affect the delivery, quality, and consistency of civic education. Consider Nunavut, which is the most northern territory with the smallest population in the country. Nunavut's education system operates under conditions that are categorically different from those in provinces. Schools serve small, geographically isolated populations, often with multi-grade classrooms, limited infrastructure, and high staff turnover.
34. The majority of students are Inuit, and Inuktitut is the first language for many learners, while much of the curriculum, including civic content, is delivered in English. Teacher recruitment and retention remain the most persistent challenge. Many educators are recruited from southern Canada on short-term contracts and arrive with little familiarity with Inuit governance structures, Indigenous legal traditions, or northern political realities. A report published by the *Arctic Review on Law and Politics* titled *Indigenous Inuit Law, 'Western' Law and Northern Issues* highlights how legal systems were introduced to Inuit communities "without much consideration of their cultural environment".²⁸
35. Furthermore, students in Nunavut and rural communities often graduate with less exposure to structured civic learning, fewer opportunities to practice participation, and weaker familiarity with formal political mechanisms. This affects not only subject instruction generally, but civic education in particular. Similarly, other rural and remote communities across Canada, especially in Northern Ontario, the prairies and Atlantic regions face similar constraints. These include limited course offerings, fewer specialised teachers, reduced access to extracurricular civic programming and diminished institutional partnerships with civil society organisations.
36. Over time, these systemic limitations contribute to lower political participation, reduced representation of Indigenous perspectives in governance, and entrenched inequities in access to power and resources. In this way, the structural realities of northern education perpetuate a cycle in which remote communities are both underrepresented in civic life and less equipped to shape policies that directly affect them.

The Committee should encourage Canada to address structural disparities in civic education affecting rural and Indigenous communities by ensuring equitable resourcing, culturally appropriate civic curricula, and sustained teacher recruitment and training in northern and remote regions. In particular, attention should be given to Indigenous governance traditions, language accessibility, and partnerships with local civil society to ensure equal opportunities for *de facto* political participation, not merely *de iure*.

²⁸ LOUKACHEVA Natalia, *Indigenous Inuit Law, "Western" Law and Northern Issues*, *Arctic Review on Law and Politics*, vol. 3 no. 2, (31 October 2012), <https://doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v3.33>.

Conclusion

37. In closing, the human rights situation in Canada with respect to civic participation and the effective exercise of political rights remains a matter of concern. The Centre hopes the Committee has found this information useful and will incorporate these findings into its concluding observations. As outlined in this report, the Centre strongly advocates for comprehensive reforms aimed at ensuring equal access to voting, strengthening electoral safeguards, improving civic education, and fostering inclusive political engagement.
38. In particular, the Committee should focus its dialogue with Canada on persistent barriers to voting access, public awareness and response mechanisms concerning external interference and misinformation, campaign finance accountability, and systemic shortcomings in civic education at the provincial level. Bill C-65 should be taken seriously and recognised as a mechanism to fulfil the obligations of Article 25, especially in the interactive dialogue. Taken together, these factors demonstrate ongoing challenges in Canada's fulfilment of its obligations under Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
39. Thus, the issues outlined in this report undermine the effective realisation of Article 25 rights for Canada's civil society and pose structural obstacles to inclusive democratic participation. Addressing these concerns is essential to ensuring that all individuals can meaningfully exercise their political rights and contribute to public affairs on an equal basis.
40. This submission may be published on the OHCHR website or any other platforms deemed appropriate. For any enquiries regarding this submission, please contact the primary contributors of this report:

Danika SURKARI / Civil Society Representative
dsurkari@cvia.ch

Samad QURAISHI / Executive Director
squraishi@cvia.ch

Centre for Voters Initiative & Action Inc.
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, P.O. 294
Washington, D.C. 20004

Index of Recommendations

We politely ask the Committee to inter alia recommend that Canada:

- CODIFY voting-access mechanisms in primary legislation, including campus and institutional polling stations, to ensure voter access is a legally guaranteed entitlement rather than a discretionary administrative practice;
- CLARIFY and formalise thresholds for public notification under the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPP), including objective criteria triggering disclosure, to ensure timely, transparent, and predictable public communication during electoral periods;
- ADDRESS vulnerabilities in nomination processes by strengthening legal safeguards against foreign or coordinated interference at the candidate-selection stage, including misleading or fraudulent nomination practices;
- REVIEW the substantive equality impacts of self-financing allowances in campaign finance law, with a view to reducing economic barriers to candidacy and preventing wealth-based distortions of political competition;
- ADDRESS disparities in civic education affecting rural, northern, and Indigenous communities by ensuring equitable resourcing, stable teacher recruitment, and sustained institutional support, whilst ensuring civic curricula in Indigenous and northern regions are culturally appropriate, linguistically accessible, and reflective of Indigenous governance traditions and legal systems; and
- REVISIT the legislative objectives of Bill C-65 (Electoral Participation Act) and consider its revitalisation or equivalent reforms as a comprehensive mechanism to strengthen electoral resilience and fulfil obligations under the Covenant.

We thank you.